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FOREWORD 
The Energy Systems Program at the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis has completed a comprehensive investigation of the worldwide balance of supply 
and demand for energy over the next fifty years, and has reported its findings in a series 
of publications (listed below) under the title Energy in a Finite World. 
This analysis involved seven years of international and interdisciplinary work aimed 
at clarifying the factual technoeconomic possibilities for achieving this balance between 
world energy demands and the possibilities for meeting them. Global scenarios were the 
devices used to strike this balance; the scenarios were based on seven world regions differ-
entiated on the basis of geography, geopolitics, and economics. 
With this global view of what seems possible and what appears to be impossible over 
the next fifty years within a frame of idealized behavior and preferences, IIASA is now 
tracing the implications at regional and national levels. Such results will provide a back-
ground for efforts undertaken by individual countries to tackle their own local-scale energy 
problems from an operational viewpoint, where their approach is dictated by decisions 
taken in the past, current and near-future imperatives, and the necessity to survive and 
compete in the situations that they face. 
In contrast, this paper presents a different, but complementary view of IIASA's 
energy analysis. Based on the realization that technoeconomic approaches often "solve" 
problems by splitting them and transferring their parts elsewhere, it searches for the deeper 
roots of obvious failures in the evolution of the energy segment of man's vital infrastruc-
ture , and seeks to identify the limits of sound principles that govern past and present deci-
sions and that become evident when we examine such failures. 
From this point of view, the author describes a serious conflict between macroeco-
nomic and microeconomic decisions that will occur if scientific and technological progress 
does not compensate for a decline in the quality of the world's energy resources. Resolving 
this conflict is an important matter for institutional and political forces to deal with. 
We appreciate the opportunity that the Scientific American offered us to present 
these ideas in its special September 1980 issue devoted to the wider problems of economic 
development in a world that experiences failures and inadequacies in most of its other 
basic systems: food, water, settlement , and industrial production. 
ROGER LEVIEN 
Director 
iv Foreword 
The publications in the series Energy in a Finite World are all reports by the Energy Systems 
Program Group of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Wolf Hafele, Program 
Leader: 
Energy in a Finite World: 1. Paths to a Sustainable Future, Ballinger Publishing Company, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA, 225 pages. An account for the general reader. 
Energy in a Finite World: 2. A Global Systems Analysis, Ballinger Publishing Company, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA, 837 pages. A comprehensive account of the technical details 
of the analysis. 
Energy in a Finite World: Executive Summary, International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria, 74 pages. A brief account for the general reader; copies 
available from the Publications Department of the Institute free of charge. 
The Appendix to this reprint lists other selected energy-related IIASA publications. 
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Energy 
The future growth in the global demand for energy will come mainly 
from the less developed countries. If the demand is to be satisfied, 
the transfer of technology from the developed countries is essential 
T he world economy entered a new era in 1973, when the Organi-zation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) announced the first 
in a series of sharp increases in the price 
of crude oil sold on the world market. 
The sudden, widespread recognition of 
the finiteness of the earth's liquid fossil-
fuel resources, brought on largely by the 
OPEC action, has left the majority of 
petroleum-importing countries-devel-
oped and less developed alike-in a con-
tinuing state of shock and uncertainty, 
which has come to be epitomized as the 
"energy crisis." It is not possible to pre-
dict with any confidence how long the 
transition to a stabler world energy per-
spective will last or exactly what its out-
come will be. What is clear is the need , 
more urgent now than ever, to reevalu-
ate the role of energy consumption as 
both the prime mover and the key indi-
cator of economic development. 
For the past six years my colleagues 
and I in the Energy Systems Program 
of the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA) at Laxen burg 
in Austria have been conducting just 
such a reevaluation, with a view to pro-
jecting a range of possible future trends 
in the world's energy supply and de-
mand. In this article I shall draw heavi-
ly on the results obtained so far in that 
continuing study. 
by Wolfgang Sassin 
From the beginning of the Industrial 
Revolution, dating at least from James 
Watt's steam engine of the 1760's, ener-
gy conservation has been an integral 
part of the strategy of development. 
Various lines of technological progress, 
ranging from the invention of new me-
chanical devices to the development of 
industrial chemical processes, are char-
acterized by a steady improvement in 
performance measured in terms of ener-
gy efficiency [see top illustration on next 
page]. The success of the basic engineer-
ing doctrine of "doing more with less" 
has resulted in a proliferation of "tech-
nical slaves" capable of substituting for 
human labor or animal power. The food 
the slaves consume is energy. 
T he acceleration of modern technol-ogy, fueled by a seemingly limitless 
supply of cheap oil, was particularly 
rapid in the already industrialized coun-
tries of the capitalist and communist 
blocs (respectively the "first world" and 
"second world") in the first decades af-
ter World War II. Recently the trend 
toward ever greater energy efficiency 
and hence greater opportunity for eco-
nomically feasible energy use has been 
augmented in these countries by the ad-
vent of automatic information-handling 
systems to help supervise the work of 
the technical slaves. The result is a world 
TSAIDAM BASIN, an extremely large interior sedimentary basin occupying much of north-
western Qinghai Province in the sparsely inhabited western part of China, is potentially a ma-
jor energy-resource basin. Formed during the Mesozoic and Cenozoic eras, the basin covers an 
area of approximately 100,000 square kilometers. Exploration for evidence of fossil-fuel de-
posits began here in the mid-1950's, and several oil and gas fields have since been discovered 
and opened for production. Exploratory drilling is currently centered in the westernmost part 
of the basin, including the area shown in the enhanced false-color Landsat mosaic on the oppo-
site page, made by digitally merging two consecutive Landsat scenes acquired as the satellite 
moved along its roughly north-south polar orbit. The mosaic was prepared by staff scientists 
at the U.S. Geological Survey's EROS Data Center who are participating with researchers 
from China's Ministry of Petroleum Industry in a joint program to investigate the applicabili-
ty of remote sensing by satellite to petroleum exploration. Members of the U.S. team who vis-
ited the arid, perennially windswept site last year reported seeing numerous drill rigs operat-
ing in the area just north and east of the lake near the center of this image, particularly in the 
vicinity of an outcropping known to the Chinese as Yushashan (Tar Sand Hill). Before the es-
tablishment of the People's Republic in 1948 China was a net importer of petroleum; today 
its petroleum industry satisfies most domestic needs and provides a minor surplus for export. 
in which the distribution of energy con-
sumption is grossly uneven. 
As of 1975 the average rate of en-
ergy consumption in the world was 
approximately two kilowatt-years per 
person per year, or in simpler terms 
two kilowatts of quasi-continuous pow-
er per person. The average American 
consumed some 11 kilowatts, however, 
whereas the average inhabitant of the 
less developed "third world" consumed 
less than a kilowatt. (The average Eu-
ropean accounted for about five kilo-
watts.) Since there is a well-established 
correlation between the energy input 
to a national economy and its econom-
ic output, measured in monetary units 
such as dollars, a graph representing the 
worldwide distribution of the consump-
tion of energy also serves as a fair ap-
proximation of the spectrum of eco-
nomic activity [see bottom illustration 
on next page]. 
There is no doubt that the further 
spread of modern technology to the less 
developed parts of the world will result 
in a greatly increased demand for ener-
gy, aggravating the energy crisis. The 
only real uncertainties concern the rate 
and the ultimate extent of the growth in 
energy demand, and the makeup of the 
energy resources that will be called on to 
meet it. In order to investigate the poten-
tial future evolution of the global ener-
gy balance under these circum\\ances 
the IIASA Energy Systems Program has 
sought first of all to quantify as many as 
possible of the variables that have a 
bearing on this vital issue. 
The task of quantification is compli-
cated by many factors, among them the 
difficulty of determining the energy effi-
ciency of a nation's productive capital 
stock (as technical slaves are usually 
called by economists). Normally one 
adds the theoretical heating values of 
the various forms of energy entering an 
economy and then compares this pri-
mary input with the designed output 
of the productive capital stock. Alterna-
tive primary forms of energy can differ 
widely, however, in their actual utiliza-
tion. Some can be easily transported, 
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INCREASING ENERGY EFFICIENCY characterizes three different lines of technological 
progress: the improvement in the performance of various steam engines (black line), the devel-
opment of superior forms of lighting (colored line) and the refinement of industrial methods 
for producing ammonia (gray line). Energy efficiency is defined for this purpose as the ratio be-
tween the output and the input of thermodynamically "free" energy to a conversion process. 
When the energy efficiencies in each category are plotted on a logistic scale, as they are here, 
the data points lie along a straight line; on a linear scale the lines would be S-shaped curves. 
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DISTRIBUTION OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION in the world varies widely, as this graph 
for the year 1975 indicates. The total amount of primary energy generated commercially that 
year was on the order of 8.2 terawatts (trillions of watts), and the world population was about 
four billion. The average rate of energy consumption was therefore approximately 2.1 kilo-
watts per person (broken-line scale markers). The top 5 percent of the world's population in 
terms of energy consumption, however, averaged more than 10 kilowatts per person, whereas 
the bottom 50 percent averaged less than a kilowatt. A n average energy-consumption rate of 
a kilowatt corresponds to the combustion of about a metric ton of coal per person per year. 
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stored and converted; others cannot. 
Such limita tions may entail significant 
losses, since part of the original energy 
must be reinvested to "step up" the qual-
ity of the final -energy form. The success 
of any energy industry is ultimately de-
pendent on its ability to produce final-
energy form s that are attractive in terms 
of both low cost and (normall y) low pri-
mary-energy losses. 
Toward that end the established ener-
gy ind us tries in the developed countries 
have over the years tapped ever more 
versatile forms of primary energy, that 
is, forms requiring less upgrading. Thus 
the industrialized countries have passed 
in a rational progression from wood 
through coal to oil, natural gas and ura-
nium. This powerful trend in the direc-
tion of greater overall energy efficiency 
is manifested in the historical record of 
the relative shares of the major primary-
energy forms in the global energy bal-
ance [see illustratio11 on opposite page]. 
Switching from abundant coal resources 
to more efficient, if less abundant, oil 
and natural-gas resources has led to eco-
nomic gains in excess of the costs in-
volved in setting up worldwide distribu-
tion systems for oil and gas. A crucial 
question for the future is whether this 
traditional cost-minimizing strategy will 
continue to serve the common good. 
T he research at IIASA has focused on the medium-term (to the year 2000) 
and long-term (to 2030) aspects of ener-
gy and its interaction with other constit-
uents of an economy. A major objective 
has been to analyze the possibilities of 
extending the supply of energy to pro-
vide more oil, gas, coal, nuclear fuel 
and other forms of energy, including 
new ones. Any such exercise would be 
meaningless, however, without a simul-
taneous evaluation of the future energy 
demand, the force driving any extension 
of the supply. 
Our approach is based on the assump-
tion of a cooperating world, free of 
major wars or social disruptions. This 
assumption is in turn a prerequisite for 
several other operating assumptions: the 
guarantee of open access by all nations 
to the world's energy resources, the uni-
versal availability of effective means 
of energy production and conversion, 
and the widespread adoption of energy-
efficient consumer technologies. It goes 
without saying that this may not be the 
way of the future. Nevertheless, quan-
tifications based on such assumptions 
serve a useful purpose : they establish 
the minimum technological and eco-
nomic effort required to balance energy 
supply and demand. 
The potential evolution of the world 
energy balance is analyzed at IIASA in 
the form of scenarios. Such scenarios 
are not merely extrapolations of past 
trends. They contain an element of judg-
ment, insofar as inconsistencies arising 
from conflicting trends have to be re-
solved. Carefully constructed scenarios 
can be seen as ways of describing poten-
tial futures. They are not predictions. 
Instead they take into account both fond 
aspirations and realistic expectations. 
The results presented in the remainder 
of this article refer to the picture of 
the future world energy balance that 
emerges from the IIASA scenarios. 
The transition from a stable world 
population of about a billion people in 
1800 to one of perhaps 10 billion is al-
ready well under way. By a conservative 
estimate the world's population will 
double, from four billion to eight bil-
lion, within the next 50 years. Whereas 
the growth of energy demand in the pe-
riod after World War II stemmed main-
ly from industrial development in the 
northern countries, where the popula-
tion was already fairly stable, the future 
energy demand will be generated main-
ly by the demographic growth of the 
southern countries. In order to take into 
account the large differences between 
countries in their levels of economic de-
velopment, their population dynamics, 
their energy resources and other perti-
nent factors the IIASA has divided the 
world into seven major regions [see illus-
tration on next page] . A complex set of 
computer models serves to project the 
economic and technological develop-
ment of each of these regions. 
It was found fairly early that a simple 
extrapolation of the trends established 
in the period from 1950 to 1975 would 
lead to a growing discrepancy between 
global energy supply and global energy 
demand. Only by postulating a consid-
erable reduction in the projected rate of 
economic growth in all the regions and a 
parallel sharp increase in the global en-
ergy supply-in terms of both estimated 
reserves and production capacities-was 
it possible to bring the future supply and 
demand totals into anything like a rea-
sonable balance. In view of the uncer-
tainties of such a dual "solution" to the 
world energy problem, two scenarios 
were developed. These models, termed 
the low-growth scenario and the high-
growth scenario, were then applied to 
each of the seven major regions. 
Both of the IIASA scenarios imply a dramatic break with past economic 
trends. The low-growth scenario in par-
ticular entails much lower rates of ec-
onomic development than those of the 
period 1950-75. Although the project-
ed growth rate in this scenario would be 
generally higher in the developing re-
gions than in the developed ones, it 
would still not be high enough for an 
adequate technological infrastructure to 
be built up in most of the developing 
countries for many decades to come. 
In addition to the modest economic 
projections built into these scenarios 
both of them incorporate optimistic es-
timates of the potential for energy con-
servation. They also reflect current 
trends toward an increase in the con-
tribution to the gross national product 
made by the services sector of the econ-
omy, toward a substantial improvement 
in energy efficiency in all sectors and 
toward early "saturation" effects in cer-
tain energy-intensive activities, such as 
transportation. This approach has en-
abled us to obtain quite detailed projec-
tions, reflecting various ways of life and 
technological conditions, of the specific 
demand for energy required for a given 
amount of economic output, measured 
as a function of "the level of economic 
activity achieved in a particular region 
f see illustration on page 8] . It is evident 
horn such projections that "decoupling" 
energy and economic growth in an ad-
vanced economy is quite different from 
doing so in a subsistence economy. In 
view of the rudimentary industrializa-
tion achieved so far in the developing 
countries it seems clear that in the dec-
ades ahead it will be harder for them to 
limit their growth in energy-intensive 
technology than it will be for the devel-
oped countries to reduce theirs. 
Complementary to the effort made to 
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reduce the energy-demand figures in 
the IIASA scenarios has been the at-
tempt to increase estimates of potential 
future energy supplies. The escalating 
price of crude oil, the form of primary 
energy now at the top of the world price 
scale, is bringing into the marketplace 
energy resources that were formerly not 
considered economically competitive. 
Our study ranks potentially recoverable 
resources of coal, oil, natural gas and 
uranium as a function of increasing pro-
duction costs [see top illustration on page 
9] . The totals we get in this way are 
much higher than the "proved" reserves 
identified as economic at present. Our 
figures nonetheless represent a reason-
able hope; they suggest that with the 
help of vigorous exploration and ad-
vanced production technologies (either 
already in existence or yet to be devel-
oped) the world could roughly triple its 
present energy reserves by 2030. 
By this accounting fossil-fuel reserves 
would amount at that time to the energy 
equivalent of 3,000 terawatt-years with-
in production-cost ranges at or even be-
low current market prices. (A terawatt-
year is the standard energy unit in the 
IIASA studies; it is 1012, or a trillion, 
1 '--~~~~~~-<-~_L.~--'..L._~-'--~--'-~~'--~--'-~--'~~-'--~---"''----' 
1850 1900 1950 1980 
SUBSTITUTION OF PRIMARY-ENERGY FORMS has historically been in the direction 
of greater overall energy efficiency. In effect this trend has manifested itself in the movement 
toward ever more versatile forms of primary energy, that is, forms that require less upgrading 
to provide final-energy forms. In this graph of the substitution of primary-energy forms in the 
U.S. the colored lines are averages of the historical data. The data are again plotted on a logistic 
scale, which represents S-shaped functions as straight lines. The lines are remarkably regular. 
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watts supplied or consumed for a year.) 
Divided by a global energy demand of 
about 30 terawatt-years per year, which 
is what we estimate as the annual rate of 
energy consumption in 2030, this pro-
jection translates into an energy reserve 
with an exhaustion time of roughly a 
century. It is imperative, however, that 
such optimistic resource estimates be in-
terpreted within the correct framework. 
First, the economic evaluation of en-
ergy resources (measured, for example, 
by the price / cost ratio) in an evolution-
ary process leading to ever cheaper en-
ergy supplies does not apply to the up-
hill fight in costs that confronts the 
world in the years ahead. Second, the 
3,000 terawatt-years' worth of oil, gas 
and coal we have projected will be qual-
itatively different from the reserves as-
sociated with these forms of energy to-
day. The rise in production costs from 
one category to another reflects impor-
tant changes that will further constrain 
the usefulness of such energy resources. 
For example, the oil in the IIASA pro-
duction-cost Category 3 consists pri-
marily of tar sands and oil shales, both 
resources that are accessible only by 
mining and retorting, not by drilling. 
The transportation and refining of a bar-
rel of oil produced in this way will be 
considerably more costly than they are 
for a barrel of today's Saudi Arabian 
light crude. Moreover, environmental 
0REGION I 
0 REGION II 
0REGION 111 
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REGION VII 
limitations quickly enter the picture if 
these resources are to be recovered and 
processed not in desert areas but close to 
heavily populated consuming ones. 
In short, tapping a major fraction of 
the resources projected in the IIASA 
models implies a difficult transition, not 
only from cheap fuels to expensive ones 
but also from comparatively clean and 
easy-to-handle fossil fuels to dirty and 
less versatile ones. Such a transition will 
also call for important adjustments out-
side the narrowly defined energy sector 
of the world economy, and it will take 
time. 
What is true of fossil-fuel power sys-
tems applies even more to advanced, 
non-fossil-fuel systems such as fission 
reactors that "breed" their own fuel, so-
lar-power generators and fusion reac-
tors. Since the fuel resources in these 
systems are in effect unlimited, the re-
source base does not influence the 
achievable levels of deployment. "Infi-
nite" energy resources of this type can 
be said to substitute capital for the finite 
natural resources that are depleted in 
fossil-fuel systems. Hence the rate at 
which an economy can afford to expand 
its fixed energy-generating capital stock 
will determine the price of these quasi-
permanent power sources and accord-
ingly their potential share of the world 
energy market. 
A satisfactory determination of this 
price cannot yet be made. It would pre-
sumably balance the capital investments 
that would have to be diverted from 
general productivity with the benefits 
that would accrue to a national econ-
omy from adding a quasi-permanent 
power source. There is a striking simi-
larity between the ambiguities inherent 
in determining a "fair" price for scarce 
fossil-fuel resources and those inherent 
in determining the price of "infinite" en-
ergy endowments such as breeder reac-
tors and solar-power generators. 
I n the absence of long-term price esti-mates a projected balance between 
energy supply and demand must rely on 
considerations of cost and other con-
straints. In the IIASA analysis such con-
straints were imposed by a specific as-
sortment of final energy requirements 
that would have to be met by the energy-
supply sector of the economy; other pos-
sible constraints include the maximum 
deployment rates of new energy tech-
nologies and limitations imposed by the 
exhaustion of certain categories of re-
sources. 
Within such constraints primary-en-
ergy-supply scenarios were construct-
ed that correspond to the high-growth 
and low-growth economic-development 
scenarios discussed above. The rela-
tive shares of primary-energy resources 
could then be calculated for the high-
WORLD IS DIVIDED into seven major energy-related regions in 
the scenarios constructed by the author and his colleagues in the En-
ergy Systems Program of the International Institute for Applied Sys-
tems Analysis (IIASA). The regions were selected mainly on the ba-
sis of economic factors rather than geographic proximity. Region I, 
North America, has a highly developed market economy and is com-
paratively rich in energy resources. Region II, the U.S.S.R. and the 
rest of eastern Europe, has a developed planned economy and is also 
quite rich in energy resources. Region III, a far-flung entity consist-
ing of western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa 
and Israel, is highly developed economically but rather poor in ener-
gy resources. Region IV, Latin America, is a developing region that 
is fairly rich in energy resources. Region V, which encompasses cen-
tral Africa, southern Asia and parts of southeastern Asia, is made 
up typically of less developed countries with scarce energy resources. 
Region VI includes the oil-rich developing countries of the Middle 
East and northern Africa. Region VII, China and the other central-
ly planned Asian economies, is a less developed area that is general-
ly self-sufficient in energy. The seven IIASA regions are not to be 
confused with different groupings discussed elsewhere in this issue. 
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growth scenario, say, as a function of 25,000 REGION I 
time, aggregating the separate calcula- 1.8% 
tions for each of the seven major IIASA 
regions. Although the patterns of pri-
mary-energy deployment were some- 12,500 
what different at the regional level for 1.9% .7% 
the low-growth scenario, the aggregate 
supply structure for the entire world 
turned out to be practically the same as 0 
in the high-growth scenario. 1950 1975 2000 2030 
The projected figures for the high- 16,000 
growth scenario show that over the 50- REGION 11 
year span of the IIASA study natural gas 3 .2% 
will maintain its present share of ap-
proximately 20 percent of the world en-
ergy market but that oil will gradually 
8,000 
decline, from 40 percent in 1980 to 20 
percent in 2030. To make up for this 
shortfall and, what is equally important, 
0 to meet the demand for liquid second- 1950 1975 2000 2030 
ary-energy forms an increasing amount 
of coal will have to be converted into 16,000 
synthetic fuels. The diversion of this REGION Ill 1.8% 
much coal from electric-power genera-
tion will in turn have to be partly com-
pensated for by the further penetration 8,000 
of nuclear power into the market for (jJ .9% 
generating electricity. Because of antici- a: 4% 
<l: 
pated resource limits on the supply of -' 
-' 
natural uranium, breeder reactors will 0 0 0 
assume an ever increasing share of the l!) 1950 1975 2000 2030 
" world energy-supply market from the ~ 5,000 
year 2000 on. Renewable energy sourc- f- REGION IV z 
es, hydroelectric power and geothermal ~ 2.4% 
power will add up to a fairly constant (/) z 
share of somewhat less than 10 percent 0 ~ 2,500 
of the total energy supply, an estimate z 
that implies a substantial increase in the 0 2.9% (/) 
absolute power-generation levels for all a: w 
these comparatively minor supply cate- CL 
a: 0 gories. From the base year of the IIASA w 1950 1975 2000 2030 CL 
study (1975) to 2030 the total primary- a.: 1,000 
energy consumption rate is projected to z 
ci REGION V rise from 8.2 terawatt-years per year to 2.4% 
36 terawatt-years per year in the high-
growth scenario and to 22 terawatt-
years per year in the low-growth one. 500 
The size of the industrial operations 2.5% 1.4% postulated as achievable in the two en-
ergy-supply scenarios can be gauged 
by comparing present and future rates 0 
of deployment of the various primary- 1950 1975 2000 2030 
9,000 
REGION VI 
2.8% 
MODEST ECONOMIC GROWTH project- 4,500 
ed in both the high-growth and the low-growth 
energy-demand scenarios constructed by the 
IIASA analysts is presented in this set of bar 5.7% 1.2% 
charts for each of the seven major world divi-
sions considered in their study. The percent 0 
figures on the connecting lines give the histor- 1950 1975 2000 2030 
ical and projected rates of economic growth 2,000 
for each region in terms of the annual growth REGION VII 
in the gross national product per person in 
that region for three different time intervals 
between 1950 and 2030. All the figures are 2.4% 
average annual growth rates (rounded to the 1,000 
nearest tenth of a percent) over the interval 
in question; actual projections in the IIASA 
5.1 % 
scenarios assumed decreasing growth rates. 
Light-colored parts of bars show the differ-
0 ence between high- and low-growth scenarios. 1950 1975 2000 2030 
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energy sources [see bottom illustration 
on opposite page]. In the high-growth 
case oil production would have to dou-
ble by 2030 and coal production would 
have to quintuple. The challenges fac-
ing the energy-supply industries in the 
low-growth scenario also appear to be 
formidable . 
The tension in the two IIASA sce-
narios between prodigious energy-con-
sumption figures and modest economic-
development prospects is symptomatic 
of the long-term global energy problem. 
To put the present trends and future 
challenges of the energy market in per-
spective it will be helpful to recall at this 
point several of the more detailed condi-
tions underlying the IIASA scenarios. 
These conditions are as follows. (1) The 
energy resources to be consumed within 
each IIASA region will have to be made 
available at production-cost prices. 
With the exception of oil this rule will 
also apply to exports to other regions. 
(2) Oil production in Region VI (the 
Middle East and northern Africa) will 
have a ceiling of 33 million barrels per 
day. In addition Region II (the U .S.S.R. 
and its allies in eastern Europe) and Re-
gion VII (China and the other centrally 
planned Asian economies) will not par-
ticipate in the oil trade between regions. 
(3) Each of the seven major world re-
gions will build up a cost-minimizing en-
ergy-supply system of its own to meet 
regional demands for final energy. (4) 
Each region will in addition assume for 
itself the burden of switching to a more 
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expensive energy infrastructure when 
the time comes. 
Together with various other method-
ological provisos these four conditions 
enable us to project a viable, if not en-
tirely satisfying, solution to the global 
energy problem. The cheapest energy 
resources would be used up gradually, 
and no region would be forced to pay 
exceptionally high energy costs long be-
fore the others would have to follow. 
Except for the oil trade originating in 
the Middle East and northern Africa, 
such a world would abstain from using 
energy as leverage for the redistribution 
of general economic productivity. 
Both the high-growth and the Iow-growth scenarios are put forward as 
possible long-term evolutionary proc-
esses. As such they imply a number of 
actions and achievements, both techni-
cal and institutional, over the next 50 
years . What are the crucial checkpoints 
that must be passed for these global evo-
lutionary scenarios to be realized? 
A particularly difficult problem with-
in the general energy puzzle is how to 
ensure an adequate supply of liquid fu-
els through roughly the year 2000. It ap-
pears from our analysis that if one ex-
cludes from consideration the central-
ly planned economies (which need not 
be driven into the tightening internation-
al oil trade, since they have compara-
tively ample oil resources of their own), 
the world will continue for some time 
to depend on oil exports from the Mid-
2,500 5,000 10,000 25 ,000 
G.N.P PER PERSON (CONSTANT 1975 DOLLARS) 
SPECIFIC DEMAND FOR FINAL ENERGY required to produce a given unit of economic 
output was projected in the IIASA low-growth energy-demand scenario as a function of the 
average level of economic activity achieved in six of the seven regions in the study. The dots 
give the historical data for the years 1950, 1960, 1970 and 1975; the open circles indicate the 
projected figures for 1985, 2000, 2015 and 2030. According to the author, the graph suggests 
that in the decades ahead it will be harder for the developing countries to limit their growth 
in energy-intensive technology than it will be for the developed countries to reduce theirs. 
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die East and northern Africa. Outside 
this region new reserves will have to 
come on stream very quickly, from both 
proved and unproved fields, including 
those in deep offshore areas and polar 
areas. The large contributions projected 
from such sources by 1990 will require 
that enormous effort be put into explo-
ration and development. It is question-
able whether such a pace will actually 
be achieved; accordingly it seems all the 
more important to prepare in plenty of 
time for the large-scale production of oil 
from unconventional sources beginning 
in about 1990. Substantial shortfalls in 
the production of oil by either conven-
tional or unconventional means below 
the volumes projected in the IIASA 
high-growth scenario would require the 
introduction of coal liquefaction on a 
globally significant scale before the year 
2000. Except for a possible delay of 10 
years in the production of synthetic liq-
uid fuels from coal the low-growth sce-
nario leads to an oil shortfall that is al-
most identical with that in the high-
growth scenario. 
The short-term and medium-term liq-
uid-fuel problem is a tremendous chal-
lenge to technology, but there is an even 
more pressing aspect of the problem, 
which is related to the quick shift that is 
bound to take place in the energy-trade 
relations between and within developed 
and developing regions in about the year 
2000 [see top illustration on page J 1). At 
that time two important turning points 
will have been reached. First, the three 
major developing regions that are now 
net oil exporters will divide into two 
subcategories: two that will continue to 
be net oil exporters, namely Region VI 
(the Middle East and northern Africa) 
and Region IV (Latin America), and one 
that will abruptly become a major oil 
importer, namely Region V (central Af-
rica, southern Asia and parts of south-
eastern Asia) . Second, the oil-buying 
competition between Region I (North 
America) and Region III (western Eu-
rope, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, 
South Africa and Israel) will be succeed-
ed by a competition between Region III 
and the energy-poor group of develop-
ing countries in Region Y. If Region I is 
not able to reduce its oil imports signifi-
cantly by the year 2000, the competition 
for imported oil among developed and 
developing countries beyond 2000 will 
become even sharper. What institution-
al arrangements would be able to man-
age these two likely transitions in the 
terms of the energy trade among major 
world regions around the year 2000? 
The full weight of such questions of 
energy-related medium-term economic 
stability will be felt in western Europe 
and Japan. In the high-growth scenario 
the dependence on imported oil in the 
Region III countries could be reduced 
by increasing imports of coal (or coal 
products) and natural gas. The low-
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in each of the seven regions considered in the IIASA scenarios are 
categorized according to increasing production costs. The cost cate-
gories represent estimates of costs at or below the stated volume of 
recoverable resources (in constant 1975 dollars). For oil and natural 
gas production-cost Category 1 includes all resources recoverable at 
a price equivalent to $12 per barrel of oil; Category 2 covers the range 
from $12 to $20 per equivalent barrel of oil, and Category 3 covers 
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the range from $20 to $25 per equivalent barrel of oil. For coal Cate-
gory 1 includes all resources recoverable at or below $25 per metric 
,ton; Category 2 covers the range between $25 and $50 per metric ton. 
In the case of coal only a part of the ultimate resource (about 15 per-
cent) was included, because the figures were already large and be-
cause many uncertainties surround long-term coal resources and pro-
duction technologies. No estimate was made of r ecoverable Category 
3 oil resources of the Middle East and northern Africa (Region VI). 
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GLOBAL CONSU MPTION RATE of a variety of primary-energy 
forms is projected to rise from a total of 8.2 terawatt-years per year 
in the base year of the IIASA study (1975) to 36 terawatt-years per 
year in 2030 according to the high-growth scenario (left) and to 22 
terawatt-years per year in 2030 according to the low-growth one 
(right). Nuclear-power sources are divided in these projections into 
conventional fission reactors (Nuclear 1) and advanced breeder-type 
fission reactors plus fusion reactors (Nuclear 2). The projections for 
direct solar power and other forms of primary energy, such as "bio-
mass" conversion, are considered optimistic by the IIASA analysts. 
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growth scenario avoids such additional 
fossil-fuel imports, but like the high-
growth scenario it pushes Region III 
into an extended competition for im-
ported oil at a crucial time: beyond 
2000, when very expensive oil will have 
to be shared with the much needier de-
veloping regions. 
T he imminent need to switch to large-scale substitutes for conventional 
oil, evident in both of the IIASA scenar-
ios, raises some important environmen-
tal questions. Deep offshore oil, heavy 
crude oil, tar sands and oil shales will all 
have to be exploited vigorously begin-
ning in about 2000. Apart from the deep 
offshore oil deposits and those in polar 
areas most of the recoverable hydrocar-
bons in this category are in nondrillable 
formations in a few large geological ba-
sins. By 2000 these basins will come to 
play a role analogous to that of the giant 
oil fields of the Middle East today. The 
IIASA high-growth scenario envisions 
an energy-production rate of a tera-
watt-year per year from this "minable" 
hydrocarbon group in about 20 years, 
most of which would have to come from 
three places: the Athabasca tar sands of 
northern Alberta in Canada, the Orino-
co heavy crudes of Venezuela and the 
Green River oil shales of Colorado, 
Utah and Wyoming in the U.S. The lo-
cal environmental consequences of such 
large operations cannot yet be ade-
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quately assessed on the basis of past or 
present experience. 
When one computes the energy ratio 
(defined as the net useful energy output 
divided by the energy invested in pro-
duction) for alternative schemes for the 
production of unconventional liquid fu-
els, one finds that an output on the order 
of .3 or .4 terawatt-year per year per 
basin would call for the combustion of 
more than . I terawatt-year per year of 
low-grade fossil fuel. In addition to the 
huge quantities of waste heat and chem-
ical pollutants that would be liberated 
the water-supply problems would be 
prodigious. Depending on the extraction 
process, the production of several tenths 
of a terawatt-year per year of synthetic 
liquid fuel would consume on the order 
of tens of cubic meters of water per sec-
ond. Significant problems are already 
encountered with wet cooling towers in 
areas such as the valley of the Rhine and 
its tributaries, where the water require-
ments are much smaller. Major prob-
lems related to land use, soil erosion and 
water pollution are likely to place fur-
ther limits on the recovery of these non-
conventional oil resources. The same 
limitations apply to the production of 
synthetic liquid fuels from compara-
tively cheap open-pit-mined coal, for 
example in the vast coal basins of the 
northern Rocky Mountain states in the 
U.S. and of the Kansk-Achinsk region 
in south-central Siberia. 
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LIQUID-FUEL SUPPLY is projected according to the IIASA high-growth scenario for the 
world excluding the centrally planned economies (Region II and Region VII). The top line 
gives the estimated demand for liquid primary-energy forms in the five regions that are expect-
ed to participate in the international liquid-fuel trade through 2030. The gray area includes 
various kinds of liquid fuel produced outside the Middle East and northern Africa (Region VI); 
the fuel sources represented include known reserves of conventional oil (A), new reserves of 
conventional oil (B), unconventional forms of oil, such as tar sands, oil shales, heavy crudes 
and other products of enhanced-recovery techniques (C), and synthetic fuels made by the liq-
uefaction of coal (D). Gap between supply and demand is filled by oil produced in Region VI 
(colored area), which is expected to reach a peak output of 33 million barrels per day in 2010. 
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Over and above the local and regional 
problems that are likely to be encoun-
tered in recovering such additional fos-
sil-fuel resources, both of the IIASA sce-
narios would lead to a worldwide risk 
that cannot be adequately quantified at 
pre5ent. It is the risk arising from the 
release of the carbon contained in such 
fuels, which would be largely in the 
form of carbon dioxide . Significant in-
creases in the atmospheric concentra-
tion of carbon dioxide have been moni-
tored for the past two decades. The pos-
sible consequences of the two IIASA 
primary-energy-supply scenarios have 
been estimated on the basis of various 
physical models, which describe the ef-
fects of increased atmospheric carbon 
dioxide on the carbon cycle in the envi-
ronment and on the exchange of radia-
tion between the earth and space. The 
reliability of these models is not yet well 
enough known, but research and moni-
toring programs are under way to im-
prove the scientific basis for judging the 
global carbon dioxide issue. 
Finally, there is another potential eco-
nomic constraint on the world's future 
energy supply, arising from the rather 
heterogeneous geographic distribution 
of all fossil-fuel resources. A large frac-
tion of the world's aggregate G.N.P. 
must be invested to build up the energy-
production infrastructure in both of the 
IIASA scenarios. It is conceivable that 
adequate rates of investment can be 
achieved, but it will surely be difficult 
for the developing countries. A verag-
ing energy investments over regions as 
we have done tends to obscure the in-
crease in the amounts of capital that 
will have to be transferred across na-
tional boundaries to develop the great 
resource basins for the purpose of pro-
ducing more fossil-fuel power. The de-
velopment within the next two decades 
of any one of the major energy-resource 
basins will require not billions of dol-
lars but hundreds of billions. Problems 
associated with the accumulation and 
control of that much capital are likely 
to lead to fiscal complexities that are 
unknown at present even to the largest 
of the world's national economies. 
T he developing countries, in view of their difficult situation, are likely to 
extend their use of local renewable ener-
gy sources as far as is practical. Exclud-
ing the large-scale direct use of sunlight, 
which under the most favorable circum-
stances will remain economically in-
feasible for decades to come, the larg-
est potential renewable energy source is 
wood and similar solid biological mat-
ter ("biomass"). Wood is still widely 
burned as a fuel in the developing coun-
tries, where it supplies a significant frac-
tion of present energy needs. 
The limitations on such renewable en-
ergy sources can be demonstrated by 
comparing natural energy-supply densi-
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ABRUPT TRANSITION in the allocation of energy exports from 
the resource-rich developing countries of Region IV (Latin America) 
and Region VI (the Middle East and northern Africa) is forecast in 
both of the IIASA scenarios for about the turn of the century. At that 
time R egion V (central Africa, southern Asia and parts of southeast-
ern Asia) will switch from being a net exporter of energy (colored area 
at top left in each graph) to being a net energy importer (colored area 
at upper right). The present oil-buying competition between Region 
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I (North America) and Region III (western Europe, Japan, Australia, 
New Zealand, South Africa and Israel) will presumably then be suc-
ceeded by a competition between Region III and Region V. If Re-
gion I does not succeed in reducing its oil imports essentially to zero 
by this point, the competition for imported oil between developed 
a nd developing countries could become sharper. The timing of the 
expected transition differs by only a few years between the high-
growth scenario (left graph) and the low-growth one (right graph). 
0::: 
7 
z 
ci 
LL 6 0 
I-
z 
w 
() 
a: 
w 5 
~ 
en 
I-
z 
w 4 ~ 
I-
en 
w 
> ~ 
Cl 3 
w 
~ 
_J 
w 
a: 2 
>-(!) 
a: 
w 
z 
w 
o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
1975 1985 2000 2015 2030 
scenario (left) and the low-growth one (right) were a veraged in the 
IIASA study over the two types of region, a procedure that tends to 
minimize the large amounts of capital that will have to be transferred 
across national boundaries to develop the great fossil-fuel resource 
basins on which much of the world's future energy supply will depend. 
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ties with the existing or expected densitv 
of human energy demand . The harvest-
ing of certain fractions of natural energy 
flows in the environment r<.:sults in spe-
cific energy-yield densities, which can be 
expressed in terms of the energy turn-
over per year per geographic area. Only 
in the most favorable cases could these 
supply densities exceed the demand den-
sities identified for the IIASA regions in 
the two scenarios. They fall short of 
even the present demand densities of ur-
ban settlements. 
The IIASA scenarios allocate all to-
gether almost 10 percent of the pro-
jected global energy supply to renew-
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able energy sources. By 2030 this would 
amount to between two and four tera-
watt-years per year, a range close to the 
maximum energy-yield estimates from 
all resource-limited sources in most of 
the world's developing regions. Accord-
ingly one has to expect a vigorous ex-
ploitation of all the biomass in Asia and 
Africa and much of it in Latin America. 
This prospect immediately raises ques-
tions of ecological stability, soil erosion, 
water requirements and global climat-
ic effects. The cumulative impact of 
stretching agriculture, bioenergy pro-
duction and hydroelectric power to their 
natural limits would transform the face 
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"INCENTIVE GAP" is foreseen by the author in the long-term transition from exhaustible 
energy resources (fossil fuels) to sustainable ones (such as breeder reactors, direct solar power 
and fusion reactors). The transition will be fundamentally different from the earlier change-
over from renewable energy resources (such as wood) to exhaustible ones in that it will have 
to b~ made at a time of rising rather than falling energy costs. It follows that traditional cost-
minimizing principles of economics cannot be relied on to stimulate the kinds of technological 
innovation needed to make the transition successfully. In this set of idealized graphs the incen-
tive gap is placed chronologically in the context of the world-population trend (top), the sub-
stitution of primary-energy forms (middle) and the specific energy costs of the three major 
categories of primary-energy forms (bottom). All three graphs have arbitrary vertical scales. 
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of the earth in the decades to come. The 
responsible limits to such an ecological 
transformation are not known . 
Th is projected view of how the world 
could balance energy supply and de-
mand in the next two to fi ve decades 
brings out issues at the interface of tech-
nolog y and politics . These issues emerge 
primarily from discrepancies among 
"what could be," "what should be" and 
"what will be." 
There is little doubt that the world 
will soon be inhabited by more people 
than the traditional renewable energy 
sources can sustain. This will be true 
even if the majority were to forgo 
achieving the material well-being the 
present-day developed countries enjoy. 
The developed countries were forced to 
give up renewable energy sources for 
fossil fuels on their way to industrializa-
tion as their energy demand began to 
exceed the local energy supply. The ear-
ly transition from wood to coal in west -
ern Europe and the U.S. was largely 
driven by this requirement. The depen-
dence of such countries on oil , natural 
gas and coal is now a worldwide phe-
nomenon. Since the world's recoverable 
resources of fossil fuels appear to be 
quite large, the industrialized countries 
could in principle be supplied with 
enough energy to last for more than a 
century, even if the developing nations 
were to gradually build up a mod-
ern technological infrastructure and in-
creasingly share in these supplies. In-
deed, it was fashionable in the l 960's to 
conclude that there would be enough 
fossil fuel to allow for a timely buildup 
of energy sources that are not resource-
limited, such as nuclear power and di-
rect solar power. 
What seems to have turned the energy 
picture upside down in the l 970's was a 
small shift in trends that is not even now 
fully appreciated. For example, it ap-
pears that the transition from fossil-fuel 
energy to nuclear energy will probably 
be an uphill fight in terms of cost and 
effort. This trend is in striking contrast 
to the earlier experience of dropping en-
ergy costs, which accompanied the tran-
sition from renewable energy sources to 
fossil fuels. The ultimate consequences 
of such shifts are difficult to foresee, 
because they depend on the resolution 
of a conflict between hitherto sound ec-
onomic principles: the minimizing of 
costs and the seizure of markets through 
technological innovation. 
The recent history of the oil market 
provides an early warning of that dilem-
ma. The drastic increase in all energy 
prices is starting to bring in more expen-
sive energy supplies and conservation 
technologies that can be justified eco-
nomically. Yet the actual production 
costs of energy remain rather low. The 
economic differential between energy 
prices and production costs, skimmed in 
the form of windfall profits by those in 
control of the prices, is definitely not 
being applied now to the buildup of new 
supply capacities at or near the new en-
ergy price levels. The OPEC countries 
are using their surplus oil income to de-
velop their economies; the governments 
of the developed countries are financ-
ing public investments from energy roy-
alties or energy taxes, trying to stim-
ulate consumption and so further eco-
nomic growth through social-transfer 
payments. In this situation high energy 
prices can be perceived primarily as a 
means for redistributing the benefits of 
hi5h industrial productivity. As long as 
the actual costs of energy production re-
main low there is no reason for the glob-
al extension of an energy-intensive tech-
nological infrastructure to be seriously 
impeded. 
I n the years ahead energy investments will certainly be directed toward the 
deployment of second-best resources. 
The principle of the minimizing of costs 
will therefore first lead to the exhaustion 
of fossil-fuel resources that are easy to 
produce, convert, transport and burn. In 
spite of the fact that production costs for 
unconventional fossil fuels will in time 
reach a break-even point with the substi-
tutes derived from nuclear power and 
solar power, reaching that point will not 
facilitate the quick buildup of the fixed 
capital stock representing these sustain-
able energy sources. The less rewarding 
the basis is on which an old infrastruc-
ture has to operate, the slower will be 
the pace at which one can afford to in-
stall an even less rewarding new infra-
structure. In short, the transition to sus-
tainable energy sources such as breeder 
reactors, direct solar power and fusion 
power might well become more difficult 
with time. 
If this turns out to be the case, the 
entire global process of development 
must be seen as a race against time. It 
can only be won once the regions dispos-
ing of high industrial productivity and 
the regions disposing of limited cheap 
resources ally their different kinds of 
wealth in order to pay the price for 
building up a basis for sustainable ener-
gy sources. It will never be a minimum-
cost operation. The transition from re-
newable energy sources to sustainable 
energy sources, the first steps of which 
have been conceptualized in the IIASA 
scenarios, appears to parallel a step 
mankind took in the Neolithic period, 
namely the transition of the food system 
from hunting and gathering to animal 
husbandry and farming. This time we 
have fossil fuels to ease the transition, 
but we have less time than our ancestors 
did. The transition to sustainable energy 
sources-breeder reactors, direct solar 
power and fusion power- cannot be put 
off to an era when the globe will have 
nearly exhausted its one-time energy en-
dowment. 
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